PREFERENCES BY INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS TO
OFFICERS, DIRECTORS OR STOCKHOLDERS
I a*. A "preference" is thepaying or securing, byan insolvent
debtor, to one or more of his creditors, of the whole or a part of their
claim to the detriment of his other creditors. The insolvent
debtor may be either a natural person or a corporation, but it is
preferences granted by an insolvent corporation to its directors,
officers or stockholders that we wish particularly to examine. In
the case of a corporation the preference is generally granted by
the directors, they being the managing agents of the concern and
therefore bound to authorize most of its business transactions.
The preference frequently takes the form either of a transfer directly to the creditor of a part of the assets of the insolvent corporation or of a mortgage or lien on the property, or of confessing
judgment in his favor to the exclusion of other creditors. "Preference" then is the expression of a motive or desire on the part of
the directors of an insolvent corporation to favor some creditors
over others, to put them, as the word implies, ahead in the race
for assets.
I b. A distinction should be made, however, between the cases
where one or more creditors are preferred to others, and cases
where a creditor, at the same time that the debt is contracted, is
given security for it. Thus where a corporation becomes financially embarrassed and needs funds at once to meet its running expenses, even though its liabilities exceed its assets, if a loan is
taken from a director, in the form of a mortgage or lien on its
property, it is clearly not a preference.' The director has put so
much money into the concern and has taken out a proportionate
amount of the assets as security for his debt. But a different
situation arises where a corporation is failing and has either ceased
* For explanation of these headings, see Analysis by the author, at end of

article.

I Cowan v. Pennsylvania, etc., Co., 184 Pa. St. i; Hopson v. Aetna, etc., Co.,
655; Millsaps v. Chapman, 70 Miss.
50 Conn. 597; Mullanphy v. Schott, 135 Ill.

952; Gordon v. Plattsmouth, etc., Co.; 36 Neb. 548; First Nat. Bnk v. Commercial, etc., Association, 185 N. Y. 575.
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to carry on its business entirely or intends shortly so to do and
being in hopeless financial straits,.gives a director security for some
pre-existing debt or claim, or secures some note or claim on which
a director is liable personally. This is clearly a preference and
gives the director an advantage not possessed by other creditors2
The transaction is not contemporaneous with the contracting of
the debt, but is separate and distinct and is not connected at all
with the borrowing of the money, but comes at a time when the
corporation sees financial failure at hand and desires to save its
own directors from loss at the expense of other creditors. It is
in that class of cases that the courts disagree as to whether the
director should be allowed to receive such a preference because of
his relation to the company. In the former case, provided the
transaction is a bona fide effort to enable the company to continue
its business and is not merely an effort to give a director a preference for a pre-existing debt, there is no question that a director
should be allowed to retain his security, and the vexing question
of preferences does not come in because it is a well established
rule in law that a director may contract and deal in business with
his corporation.
I c. As a preference is an act done when insolvent, it becomes
important to determine when a corporation can be said to be insolvent and examine under which of the various states of insolvency
the question of preferences would be most likely to arise.
When a corporation has been declared bankrupt under the
National Bankruptcy Act, it is-said to be insolvent. This statute
enacted by Congress provides a method by which the assets of
an insolvent may be distributed among his creditors, under the
supervision of the court. 3 His assets, therefore, being out of his
own control and in the hands of the court, the question of preferences can not arise, as it is provided that there can be no payment to a creditor by the bankrupt.
A corporation is said to be insolvent also when it has made
2 Sutton Mfg. Co. v. Hutchinson, 63 Fed. *496;Lippincott v. Shaw Carriage
Co., 25 Fed. 577; Rokker v. Paper Co., 88 III. App. 278; Beach v. Miller, 130
I1l. I62; Rouse v. Merchant's Nat. Bank, 46o Mo. 493; Taylor v. Gray, 59 N. J.

E.

62.

Bankruptcy Act, 1898, 324 U. S. Stat. at large. 797.
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an assigriment for the benefit of its creditors and its assets are insufficient to meet its liabilities.' And here, unless some statute
permits preferences to be granted in connection with the assignment, such preference will be declared void, whether it be in the
form of security for a debt or the transfer of property. Here also
the assets of the corporation are taken by the assignment out of
its own hands and consequently the question of preferences will
not arise.
When a corporation has ceased to carry on the business for
which it was organized, and its liabilities exceed its assets it is
clearly insolvent, and also in the case where, although it may be
continuing its business, there is no prospect that its assets will be
increased sufficiently to meet its liabilities, or where it is at present
a going concern, but is about to take a step that will incapacitate
it from continuing its business further. It is in these cases that
the courts differ as to the right of the corporation to prefer certain
creditors to the detriment of others, and in speaking of an insolvent
corporation it will be understood to mean one that is in this condition.
"To render a corporation insolvent within the rule prohibiting
preferences," said the Alabama court, "it is not enough that the
assets are insufficient to meet all its liabilities, if it be still prosecuting its line of business with the prospect and expectation of continuing to do so; in other words, if it be in good faith what is sometimes called a going business or establishment. Many successful
corporate enterprises, it is believed, have passed through crises
when their property and effects, if brought to present sale would
not have discharged all their liabilities in full. On the other hand
when a corporation's assets are insufficient for the payment of its
debts and it has ceased to do business and has taken or is about
to take a step which will practically incapacitate it for conducting
the corporate business with reasonable prospect of success, or its
embarrassments are such that early suspension and failure must
ensue, then such corporation must be pronounced insolvent."'
We see then that something more than the liabilities exceeding the
4Chamberlain

v. Bromberg, 83 Ala. 576; Fietsain v. lay,

Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 14o N. Y. 563.
bCarey v. Wadsworth, 99 Ala. 68.
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assets is necessary before a-corporation can be called insolvent in
the sense that we here use it.
II a. The cou ts have not always agreed as to whether an
insolvent corporation might prefer certain general creditors who
are not directors, officers or stockholders. Some have taken the
attitude that as an insolvent debtor is allowed this right of preferring certain creditors, there is no reason, in the absence of statute, why an insolvent corporation should be denied the right. A
corporation, they say, is but an artificial person endowed, in respect to the business which it is transacting, with the attributes of a
natural person, and, like a natural person, should be allowed to
select a particular creditor and prefer his claim to others.' In a
leading case upholding this right to grant preferences, where the
directors of an insolvent bank preferred a certain creditor by paying money and assigning notes, it was said: "The cases of an individual and a corporation, in the matter under discussion, it appears
to me, are not merely analogous, but identical; and I discern no
reason for the slightest difference between them. There exists
no doubt that there have been many instances of actually insolvent corporations, where certain creditors have been preferred to
others, and the perfect silence until now on the subject of this
fancied diversity is powerful to show what has been the universal
opinion." ' 7 In another case it is said: "An individual may turn
out part or the whole of his property in payment of his debts and
in so doing may prefer creditors. We do not see why this corporation may not do the same, and that through its board of directors.
Kent lays it down: 'Independent of positive law, all corporations
have the absolute jus disponendi of lands and chattels, neither
limited as to object nor circumscribed as to quantity.' In addition here the law of the state where the corporation was created
conferred upon it the right to make contracts, acquire and transfer
property with the same powers in such respects as private indidividuals. "s
6Catlin v. Eagle Bank, 6 Conn. 233; Reichwald v. Commercial Hotel Co.,
io6 Ill. 439; Buell v. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284; Garrett v. Burlington Plow
Co., 70 Iowa, 697; Planters Bank v. Whittle, 78 Va. 737; Holins v. Brierfield, etc., Irdn Co., 15o U. S. 171; -SanfordFork, etc., Co. v. Howe, 157 U.S. 312.
7 Catlin v. Eagle Bank, 6 Conn. 233.

sReichwald v. Commercial Hotel Co., xo6 Ill. 439.
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In fact except in the jurisdictions where the trust fund doctrine has obtained a footing and is applied strictly, we rarely find
the analogy between the natural debtor and the artificial person,
as a debtor, questioned in regard to the granting of preferences in
insolvency.
IIb. In the jurisdictions where such preferences are denied
an insolvent corporation it is often found that the courts have
adopted the trust fund doctrine referred to above. This doctrine
because of its wide influence and the courts of high authority
which have announced and followed it, will be more particularly
noticed. The so-called "trust fund doctrine" was definitely
announced for the first time by Mr. Justice Story in Wood v.
Dummer, 3 Mason 3o8, in 1824. A banking corporation had distributed a greater part of its capital among its stockholders, as
dividends, and left nothing for the payment of its creditors. In
deciding the case the learned judge took the position, "that the
capital stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust fund for
the payment of the debts contracted by the bank. . ..
If the
capital stock is a trust fund, then it may be followed by the creditors into the hands of any person having notice of the trust attaching to it." It is seen from the case stated that the decision
could have been based on fraud without going further because it is a
clear case of fraud on the creditors, but the court chose to base
the decision on the ground of the assets of a corporation being a
trust fund for the creditors. The doctrine once being announced'
was taken up at once by many courts and applied to cases of preferences by insolvent corporations, and the courts argued that as
the assets, on insolvency, became a trust fund, the directors, being
the trustees of the fund, could not prefer certain creditors and exclude others. It was often said that the creditors, under the trust
fund doctrine, could follow and subject to the payment of their
claims assets wrongfully distributed among or withdrawn by the
stockholders, and that when the corporation became insolvent
particular creditors could not be given or obtain any preference
by way of payment or security over other creditors. If based on
fraud on the creditors, the resulting conclusions are undoubtedly
correct, but the doctrine has led many courts into rather extreme
positions, as for example that the directors of an insolvent corporation are absolute and technical trustees.

168

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVA NIA LA V REVIEW

The Supreme Court of the United States at first accepted the
doctrine in its fullest sense, but has long since limited it to mean
only that the corporation's property must be applied to the payment of the debts of the corporation before any part of it could be
distributed to the stockholders; and as between itself and its creditors the corporation is simply a debtor and does not hold its
property in trust in any other sense than does an individual debtor.t
The result has been that although many courts still speak of the
trust fund doctrine in some connections and speak of the directors being trustees to the extent of not being allowed to prefer or
reap any benefit for themselves, it is not often fotnd that a court
denies a preference to a general creditor because of the trust fund
doctrine. One line of cases holds that the trust fund theory, that
prevents preferences, does not attach until a court of equity has
taken charge of the corporate property, in some proper proceeding,
with a view to administering it. But it will be seen at once that
this is not the trust fund doctrine in any proper sense, because it
is a well known fact that, after a court of equity has taken charge
of the corporate assets, no preference will be allowed.
Another reason might be assigned for denying preferences by
insolvent corporations, namely, that the fact that the corporation
is allowed to carry on business in the corporate capacity and that
the liability of its members is limited to a certain fund, would require the corporation to give up the additional privilege of preferring certain creditors. This view has not been taken by the
courts, but it seems to be an argument against the complete analogy
which many of the courts draw between the natural person as
debtor and the corporate debtor.
The individual when he trades alone or associated with others
is unlimitedly liable for his debts. When therefore a group of
individuals receives a corporate franchise, one of the privileges
of which is that their liability shall be limited to the common fund,
it might well be argued that in return for this privilege they shall
be required to abandon the right to grant preferences, and further
that it rendered void any attempt to exercise the right of granting
preferences. The states that have enacted statutes denying pre9 Hollins v. Brierfield, etc., Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371.
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ferences by insolvent corporations doubtless had this idea in view
and believed that a business concern acting in a corporate capacity and having received certain material benefits and privileges
from the state, such as the power to contract as an individual,
limited liability, and rights under a corporate franchise, should not
have the additional common law right of preferring certain creditors. It is true that in the absence of statute it may seem hard to
deny the analogy between the individual and corporate debtor in
the right of granting preferences, but in view of the unusual rights
and privileges that are incident to corporate existence it seems a
proper place for legislation to step in and bar a corporation from
doing an act which is undoubtedly a hardship on certain of its
creditors although it may be an act which is allowed it by law.
II c. As mentioned above, several states, recognizing the right
of an insolvent corporation to grant preferences have enacted
statutes prohibiting such preferences, 0 having come to the conclusion that it is inequitable for a corporation when insolvent or
in failing circumstances, to turn over to certain creditors all or a
greater part of its assets, leaving other creditors with equally
meritorious claims, without redress. For the provisions of the
var.ous statutes the laws of the various states should be consulted,
but some of the more important may be mentioned.
The National Banking Act prohibits and renders void any
transfer or conveyance by a national bank, to prefer a creditor,
after an act of insolvency or in contemplation thereof. In Massachusetts, the general insolvency law provides that if a person
being insolvent or in contemplation thereof, within six months
before the filing of a petition in insolvency proceedings by or
against him, shall give a preference to any creditor, such preference shall be void; and this provision is made expressly applicable
to corporations. Michigan, New Jersey and New York have
similar statutes differing in only minor details. The Virginia
statute provides in substance that if a corporation create any lien
10New York, 3 N. Y. Rev. Stat. 591, ss. 9, 10; 3 N. Y. Rev. Stat. (8th ed.)

s. 4; 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. (8th ed.) p. 1554, ss. 186, 187; N. Y. Laws (1896),
c 688, s. 48.
New Jersey, Pub. Laws, 1896, p. 298, s. 64; North Carolina, Code s. 685;
Illinois, General Assignment Act; Minnesota, Laws of 1881, chap. 148.
p.
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or incumbrance upon its works or property for the purpose of giving
a preference to one or more creditors except it secures a debt contracted at the time of the creation of the lien, the same shall inure
ratably to the benefit of the creditors.
The National Bankruptcy Acte as enacted by Congress does
not apply to all corporations, but to corporations "engaged principally in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, mining or
mercantile pursuits." The act also provides in §6ob, "If a bankrupt shall have given a preference and the person receiving it or
to be benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall have had
reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a
preference it shall be voidable by the trustee, and he may recover
the property or its value from such person." It is thus seen that
it is a violation of the Bankruptcy Act for a corporation to transfer
any of its property to one or more creditors with intent to prefer
such creditors. It does not follow however, that a payment or
transfer of assets by an insolvent corporation to a creditor is necessarily an act of bankruptcy. Two things must concur in order
to constitute such payment or transfer of assets an act of bankruptcy; (i) such payment or transfer must be made with the intent to prefer the creditor over other creditors; (2) and it must be
done at a time when the corporation is insolvent. The burden of
proving both intent and insolvency is upon the person alleging the
same. It is thus seen that knowledge of an intent to prefer on the
part of the creditor is made material under this Act, whereas in
other cases such knowledge is not brouight into question.
It must be remembered that where, either by the common law
or by statute, all preferences by insolvent corporations are denied,
the question of preferences to officers, directors or stockholders
can not arise, so in the following discussion it will be presumed
that reference is had to states where such preferences to general
creditors are allowed.
I II. We now come to consider the question of the right of
an insolvent corporation to prefer its own stockholders, who are
also creditors, and to find out whether any rule applies to them
which does not apply to general creditors. The courts are far
it

Bankruptcy Act, 1898, 32 U. S. Stat. at large.
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from unanimous on this point, but it seems that their opinions
are generally based upon the real position of the stockholders in
relation to the company and not on the mere fact of whether the
person preferred own stock in the company or not. Some courts
have taken the position that the fact of being a stockholder carries
with it the relation of proprietor and have denied preferences on
that ground, much as they would deny a preference to a member of
a partnership.' The greater number of courts however, have,
with apparently better judgment inquired into the real relation
of the stockholder to the company. 3 Thus in a small corporation
where the stock is held by a few persons and each of these by necessity is intimately connected with the management of the company, the preference would probably be denied them, while in a
large corporation where the stockholder, except in his right to
participate in the selection of officers, has no control over the management, the corporation would doubtless be allowed to grant him
a preference to the same extent that it could prefer a general
creditor who was entirely disconnected with the company. When
a stockholder is in fact also one of the officers or managers of the
corporation, then another question is brought up which will be
treated. later under preferences to directors, but which has no
place in a discussion of a stockholder's rights as such. It is a wellsetted principle of law that a stockholder may deal with the corporation as if he were an entirely disinterested outsider and that
his relation of stockholder as such would in no way bar him from
becoming a creditor of the company. "The circumstance of

being a stockholder in the corporation," says an Illinois case,
"did not debar him from obtaining security for debts due to himself to the exclusion of other creditors."" This view is held by
probably the majority of the courts, or as was said in Kentucky,
"a stockholder in a corporation may deal with the company as an
individual, and become a creditor as any other individual, and may
be secured as a preferred creditor in an assignment by the cor2 Reagen v. Chicago First Nat. Bank, 157 Ind. 623; Washington Mill Co.
v. Sprague Lumber Co., io Wash. 165.
13 Reichwald v. Commercial Hotel Co., io6 III. 439; Parsons v. Hattonzsnowden Co., 58 Ill. App. 272; Lexington, etc., Ins. Co. v. Page, 17 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 412; Whitewell v. Warner, 20 Vt. 425.
14 Reichwald v. Commercial Hotel Co., 1o6 Ill. 439.
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poration, without on that account incurring the imputation of
fraud. "'
IVa. The cases in regard to preferences by insolvent corporations over which there has been the greatest conflict among
the courts have arisen where the corporation has .attempted to
prefer one of its own directors or officers by either paying or securing his debt and allowing other creditors, in whose welfare it is not
interested, to go unpaid and without relief. The question, of
course, does not arise in jurisdictions where, either because of the
common law or statute, all preferences are denied, for there the
directors or officers are barred from being preferred just as any
general creditor would be. But aside from these cases, we find
many in which the views of the courts are in conflict and they base
their holdings on various grounds. Before going into the examination of this class of preferences it will be well to clear up some
collateral matters that frequently arise when this subject of
preferences to directors is discussed.
IV b. The distinction before referred to should always be kept
in mind in considering this subject, namely the difference between
securing and preferring a director. Even where the debts of a
company exceed its assets, but it is still a going concern the director
is generally allowed to advance money or credit to the corporation
in a bona fide effort to keep it alive, and in return to take security
for the debt. Where such a transaction is made in good faith,
there in no reason to deny the director his advantage over unsecured creditors. This is a very different case from the one where,
on insolvency, the director obtains payment or security for a prior
indebtedness and one not contracted at the same time that the
security was given. The Georgia court and a Federal court have
gone further however, and not allowed a director any advantage
even in a bona fide transaction when the security was given at the
same time the debt was contracted."8
IV c. Another question that frequently comes up, in jurisdictions where preferences to general creditors are allowed, is whether
the right of a general creditor to accept a preference of his claim
Is Lexington, etc., Ins. Co. v. Page, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 412.
16 Monroe, etc., Co. v. Arnold, io8 Ga. 449; Wyman v. Bowman,

127

Fed.
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is affected by the fact that one or more directors are indorsers or
guarantors of his debt. Several courts have used ingenious arguments to uphold such preferences. The Illinois court has said:
"His relation as a creditor is created by his contract with the corporation and not with the guarantors. He is just as clearly, by
law, a creditor with such guaranty as without it. His rights as
such creditor remain, to the end, unimpaired, (luring solvency and
through insolvency . . . . The creditor loaned this money to
the corporation in good faith, while solvent and a going concern,
and the money so obtained was used for its benefit. On no principle of law or reason can such creditor be deprived of his right to
a preference merely because the directors guaranteed the debt.
The act of obtaining such guaranty on the part of the creditor or
giving it on the part of the directors was neither illegal nor improper. It is not uncommon for the directors to be compelled to
lend their personal credit by way of surety or guaranty, in order to
secure means to carry on the business. If this is done during
solvency, for the benefit of the corporation, neither the right of
such creditor so loaning on such guaranty, nor the power of the
directors, is in any way affected or abridged as to a preference of
such a debt."u7
On the other hand, where preferences to directors are not allowed, such an argument certainly is not consistent because the
directors, by voting the preference to the creditor, would surely
prefer themselves by relieving themselves from personal liability
on the debt. The question will be treated along with the question
of preferences to directors, but it may be said that in jurisdictions
where preferences to directors are not allowed by the deided weight
of authority, a creditor may not be preferred on insolvency who
has his debt guaranteed or indorsed by one or more directors.8
However, while the corporation is a going concern, continuing and
intending to carry on its business, a director may secure or indemnify himself against possible loss by reason of his indorsement
17Rackford, etc., Grocery Co. v. Standard Groc. Co., 175 Ill.
89.
1
8Lowry Banking Co. v. Empire Lumber Co., 9o Ga. 624; Rosebloom v.
Whittaker, 132 Il. 8r; Love Mfg. Co. v. Queen City Mfg. Co., 74 Miss. 290;
Merchants Nat. Bank v. McDonald, 63 Neb. 363; Taylor v. Gray, 59 N. 3. E.
621; Consolidated Tank Line Co. v. Kausar, etc., Co., 45 Fed. 7; Lippincott v
Shaw Carriage Co., 34 Fed. 570.
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of corporate debts, and the subsequent insolvency of the company
can not prevent the directors from enforcing the security given
him. But this is clearly a different case from where, after insolvency, the directors prefer a debt on which some of their number
are liable.
IV d. Some courts seem to have drawn a distinction between the cases where the vote of the individual director preferred
was necessary to carry the motion granting the preference and the
cases where there was the necessary majority of unpreferred directors present and voting."' The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
said, with better reasoning: "It is unnecessary to decide the question whether there was a quorum of disinterested directors that
directed the mortgage to be given. The mortgage is an entirety
and it makes no difference how many persons are severally interested in it as mortgagees. If such mortgagees, as directors,
authorized it, they authorized an act in which they were all jointly
interested. They may not have been joint creditors, but they are
joint mortgagees, because the mortgage as a security is an entirety.
Whether in this view, the mortgage was never authorized to be
given by the president and secretary of the company, by the company through its directors, it may not be necessary to decide, but
it seems to me rather illogical to say that, because there is a quorum
of directors who are creditors severally, a majority of them may
authorize their claims to be secured by one mortgage, and do not
act on their own claims, but each one acts in respect of the claims
of the others.""0 This, it is submitted is the better view, and the
one that has with it the weight of authority. The Supreme Court
of Indiana, however, in holding that a preference made in favor-of
two directors was valid where the execution of the mortgage
making such preference was authorized by the unanimous vote of
five directors, these constituting the entire directorate, said:
"Consequently, a majority of the directors, constituting a quorum,
by their votes authorized the preference, independent of the two"'
in whose favor such preference was made.
19

Taylor v. Mitchell, 80 Minn. 492; Klein v. Funk, 82 Minn. 3; European,
etc., R. Co. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277; Buell v. Buckingham, i6 Iowa, 284; Leveringv.
Bimel, 146 Ind. 545; Nappanee Canning Co. v. Reid. etc., Co., i59 Ind. 614.
10Haywood v. Lumber Co., 64 Wis. 639.
11Levering v. Binel, 146 Ind. 545.
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In the jurisdictions where directors are not allowed to prefer
themselves the right to prefer their relatives and friends has also
been denied them. Thus a director of an insolvent corporation
could not provide for the payment of a debt due his wife from the
corporation and exclude other creditors." This is the natural
effect of the rule denying preferences to directors because the preferring of those in whom the director is personally interested is
merely another way of preferring the director himself. And a
preference made in favor of an estate of a deceased director by the
remaining board, two of whom were brothers of the deceased director, was held void, and the unsecured judgment creditors were
allowed to recover of the directors such percentage of their debts
as they would have received if the sum wrongfully paid by way of
such preference had been divided pro rata among all unsecured
creditors.2" It follows from this that directors are not allowed to
prefer another corporation of which they, or a majority of them,
are the managing officers and directors. Thus a bank whose
officers were also the defacto managers of another bank, known by
them to be insolvent and about to go into the hands of a receiver,
could not, as against a receiver subsequently appointed, retain
assets of the insolvent bank as collateral security for the payment
of its indebtedness.'
IVe. It has been held, in jursidictions where officers are not
allowed to prefer themselves, that the rule does not apply where an
officer has paid himself for back salaries. 5 When a corporation
has accepted the services of an officer and he has allowed his salary
to remain unpaid for some time, in order to relieve the strain on the
finances of the corporation, such salary is a preferred claim on the
corporate assets and an officer has been allowed to pay to himself
this back salary even when he knew that the corporation was in an
insolvent condition. This is not the unanimous rule, but has been
frequently applied and is apparently based on principles of justice
and right.
= West v. West, etc., Mfg. Co., 44 Hun. (N. Y.) 623.
23Adams
v. Kehlor Milling Co., 35 Fed. 432.
2
4Slack v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 1o3 Wis. 57.
2Asheville Lumber Co. v. Hyde, 172 Fed. 730; Richmond Standard Steel,
etc., Co.v. Allen, 148 Fed. 657; Potts v. Rose Valley Mills, 167 Pa. St. 310.
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V. A large number of states that allow preferences to be
granted to ordinary creditors and to stockholders have denied the
right of a director or officer of an insolvent corporation to receive
Thus where a corporation has become insuch a preference."
solvent and is unable to carry on its business or when it appears
that its insolvency is inevitable within a short time, the directors
would not be allowed to meet and execute a mortgage on the property of the company to secure some debt which the corporation
may owe them and which they see will not be paid in full unless
such security is taken, because the assets of the company would
have to be distributed pro rata among all the general creditors,
Neither, as has been already stated, in
themselves included."
such a situation, 2would
they be allowed to secure or pay some creditor of the company holding corporate notes on which they are
sureties or indorsers, and thus relieve themselves from personal
liability; for in this case the transaction would be as much a preference as if they had paid themselves directly. The same principle is applied where the corporation confesses judgment in favor
of a director who is a creditor, or in favor of a creditor for the payment of whose debt the directors are personally liable as iqdorsers.
Any preference so granted to a director or officer will be declared
void and he will be required to relinquish the amount in excess of
26Lippincott v. Shaw Carriage Co., 25 Fed. (Ind.) 577; Adams v. Kehlar
Milling Co., 35 Fed. (Mo.) 433; Consol. Tank Line Co. v. Kansas, etc., Co., 45

Fed. (Mo.) 7; Bouney v. Tilley,

1o9

Cal. 346; Fishel v. Goddard, 30 Colo. 147;

Lowry Banking Co. v. Lumber Co., 91 Ga. 624; Milledgeville Banking Co. v.
McIntyre, etc., Store, 98 Ga. 503; Atlas Tank Co. v. Hardware Co., Ioi Ga.
393; Rokker v. J. W. Butler, etc., Co., 88 III. App. 278; Cahill v. Peoples, etc.,
Co., 47 La. Ann. 1483; Janney v. Minneapolis Industrial Expo., 79 Minn. 488;
Love Mfg. Co. v. Queen City, etc., Co., 74 Miss. 290; Ingeversen v. Edgecombe,
42 Neb. 471; Reynolds v. Smith, 6o Neb. 197; Montgomery v. Phillips, 53 N. J.
E'q. 203; Taylor v. Gray, 59 N. J. Eq. 621; Hill v. Lumber Co., 113 N. C. 173;
Kersteter's Appeal, 149 Pa. 148; Pangburn v. American Valut Co., 205 Pa. 83;
Sweeny v. Grape Sugar, etc., Co., 30 W. Va. 443; Hulings v. Hulings, etc., Co.,
38 W. Va. 351; Rowe V. L.euthold, 101 Wis. 242; Koehler v. Black River, etc., Co.,
2 Black (U. S.) 715; Richardson v. Green, 133 U. S. 30; Kittel v. Augusta Ry.,
78 Fed. (N. J.) 855.
27 Lippincott v.Shaw, etc., Co., 25 Fed. (Ind.) 577; Atlas Tank Co. v. Hardware Co., iox Ga. 393; Rokker v. Paper Co., 88 I11.
App. 278; Ingeversen v.
Edgecombe, 42 Neb. 741; Montgomery v. Phillips, 53 N. J. Eq. 203; Kersteter's
Appeal, 149 Pa. 148; Rowe v. Leuthold, io Wis. 242.
'I (b)
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what would have been a pro rata share among all the general
creditors had he not received such preference.
In denying the right of a director to receive a preference, the
courts have assigned various reasons to justify their position. Of
course, in the states where statutes exist denying the right to
grant preferences in all cases the directors are barred from receiving
preferences just as any other creditor would be. Also where the
trust fund doctrine is still adhered to in its strictest sense, and all
creditors are denied the right of receiving preferences, the same
principle applies to directors, and they are prevented from receiving an advantage, on the ground that all the creditors should receive an equal share in the assets of the insolvent company. But
a large number of courts that are not governed in their decision
by either of the above reasons have denied the preferences to directors on other grounds. Some courts, while not holding that
the assets of all insolvent corporations are a trust fund for equal
distribution among the creditors, state that the powers of the directors are held in trust by them for all creditors and can not be
used by them for their own benefit. Thus the directors, while not
considered as technical trustees of a trust fund, are treated as
fiduciaries and held to the rule that a fiduciary can not reap a benefit to himself which arises out of his position as such. Another
court puts it that directors are fiduciaries as to their powers and
the law prohibits a trustee from speculating in the subject matter of
his trust.. Much the same position has been taken by the courts.
that say that as the director's position as manager of the company
puts him in a position of special knowledge as to corporate affairs,
he shall not be allowed to use this special knowledge to gain advantages for himself that are not open to other creditors. Other
courts have carried out the analogy between the individual debtor
and the corporate debtor and say that as an individual debtor
can not secure an advantage to himself when insolvent, neither
can directors or managers of an insolvent corporation secure preferences to themselves. Another court has said that the directors ought not to be competitors in a contest of which they must be
the judges.
In Koehler v. Iron Co.2' it was said, in speaking of a preference
"2

Black (U. S.) 715.
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obtained by the directors: "Directors can not thus deal with the
important interests entrusted to their management. They hold
a place of trust and by accepting the trust are obliged to execute
it with fidelity, not for their own benefit, but for the common
benefit of the stock-holders of the corporation."
And in Barney
v. Tilley' the court said, in speaking of directors' powers: "These
powers are held by them in trust for all the creditors and can not
be used for their own benefit. It is to be observed however, that a
person who is creditor of an insolvent corporation is not deprived
of any of his rights as creditor by the- fact that he also occupies
the position of director of the company. He is merely incapacitated as director from using any of the powers of his position for
his own benefit or the benefit of his co-directors."
In Fisher v. Goddardn the court said: "The relationship of a
director of a corporation to the legal entity which he represents is
fiduciary and the law treats him as a trustee in this respect. A
purchase by him of corporate assets may not be void ab initio as
to creditors, but he will not be permitted to reap a benefit to their
detriment, by dealing in them as a third party, because the law
inhibits a trustee from speculating in the subject matter of his
trust."
In the case of Lippincott v. Shaw Carriage Co.- the court
carried out the analogy between the individual debtor who is insolvent and the insolvent corporation, and stated that the trust
fund doctrine is not necessary in order to deny preferences to
directors: "While it is generally conceded that a corporation,
notwithstanding insolvency, continues possessed of a general power
of management of its affairs and, like natural persons, may give preferences by way of payment or security to one creditor or class of
creditors over others, yet in close analogy to the rule which prohibits the giving of preferences by individual debtors for the purpose of securing, or in such a manner as to secure advantage or
benefit to themselves, and in manifest accord with the tendency
of judicial opinion as expressed upon consideration of kindred
questions, it has been decided in a number of cases that preferences
w 109

Cal. 346.
l' 30 Colo. 147.
- 25 Fed. (Mo.) 577.
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given by insolvent corporations in such a manner as to be of a
special benefit to the directors or managing agents or any of them,
will be set aside."
In Howe v. Tool Co3 the court said: "A sound public policy
and a sense of common fairness forbid that the directors or managing agents of a business corporation, where disaster has befallen
or threatened the enterprise, shall be permitted to convert their
powers of management, and their intimate, it may be exclusive
knowledge of corporate affairs into means of self-protection to the
harm of other creditors. They ought not to be competitors in a
contest of which they must be the judges."
It is thus seen that these preferences are denied on a number of
grounds, and probably a majority of the courts today would take
one of these positions and not allow a director to receive a preference. Other courts, as it will be seen, have justified such preferences and these will now be considered.
VI. Although the weight of authority is probably in accord
with the rule just stated, some courts have carried the right of
an insolvent corporation to prefer creditors to the extent of allowing preferences to be granted to directors and officers of the company.u Several grounds have been giverr as a basis of decision,
but most of the courts seem to feel that if they do not follow the
trust fund doctrine and deny all preferences, there is no place to
stop, short of allowing preferences to directors.
An early Iowa case adopted the rule and the court said that,
although it might be a good case for the legislature to change the
law, giving pro rata to all creditors, they had no power to deny a
preference to directors in the present state of the law."'
In Corey v. Wadsworth3' the court overruled an earlier case
=344 Fed. (Ind.)

231.

v. Stevens, 129 Ala. 63o; Carey v. Wadsworth, xx8 Ala. 488; West
v. Hanson Bod. Co., 6 Colo. App. 467; Smith v. Skeary, 47 Conn. 47;Warfield
v. Mars':all, etc., Co., 72 Iowa, 666; Buell v. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284; Planter's
Bank v. Whittle, 78 Va. 737; Brown v. Furniture Co., 58 Fed. 286; Sanford Fork
& Tool Co. v. Howe, 157 U. S. 312; Foster v. Planing Mills, 93 Mo. 79; Railway
Co. v. Claghorn, i Speers Eq. (S. C.) 545; Campan v. Detroit Driving Club, 135
Mich. 575.
3s 16 Iowa 284.
36 118 Ala. 488.
34 Wilson
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in this respect and said: "One just and honest debt, it seems necessary to remark, is as just and honest as any other just and honest
debt, and may be paid in the same way under the same conditions.
To the exercise of this undoubted right to make pre....
ferences it is essential that the corporation must act. It can only
act through the directors. If the directors can not act to the end
of preferring their own just debts-having the undoubted right to
such preferences-the preference can not be made and the entitled
right of the corporation to make it and of the directors to accept
it is denied and defeated." This court had repudiated the trust
fund doctrine which it had adhered to before and through the above
argument justified the granting of preferences to directors by themselves.
The Missouri court, after stating that the assets of an insolvent corporation were not a trust fund, said: "Then if the assets of an insolvent corporation in the hands of its board of directors are not a trust fund to be used for the benefit of all of its
creditors ratably, can not they dispose of the property to themselves
as creditors, to the exclusion of others if desired, bound only by the
limit of good faith?" 7
-In an Indiana case, a mortgage executed by an insolvent
corporation, in compliance with an agreement to secure an advance
of money to discharge an indebtedness of the corporation, was held
valid as against its creditors although the president and secretary
were individually liable on the indebtedness so discharged, of which
fact the mortgagee had knowledge.'
In Buell v. Buckingham' referred to above, the court announced that "being an officer in the corporation did not deprive
Buell of the right to enter into competition with the other creditors
and run the race of diligence with them, availing himself in the
contest of his superior knowledge and of the advantages of his
position to obtain security for the payment of his debt."
It is thus seen that the courts are not unanimous in their
denial of the right to grant preferences to directors or officers.
The trust fund doctrine seems to have caused as great confusion
7 Butler v. Harrison Co., 139 Mo. 467.
u Bank v. Dovetail Gear Co., 143 Ind. 550.
2616 Iowa 284.
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and done as much evil to the courts that have abandoned it as to
those that have retained it. Having repudiated the doctrine, the
courts go to the other extreme and refuse to recognize any fiduciary relation whatsoexer existing between the directors and the

creditors of an insolvent corporation.
Some courts, like the 'Missouri court," have allowed these
preferences to directors to stand, in the absence of bad faith or an
intent to delay or defraud the other creditors. This rule however
does not seem to mean anything because it is not the question
whether they intended to prefer themselves in good faith, but
whether the preference itself should be allowed.
Besides,
actual bad faith can rarely be proved in preference cases, because
of the abundance of opportunity open to the directors to conceal
their fraudulent purposes, and unless, as a matter of law, a director
is deemed to act in bad faith when he accepts payment or security
from the insolvent corporation to the exclusion of other creditors.
VII. From the above discussion, we may deduce a few
general principles in regard to preferences. In the first place, if
we admit the common law right of an insolvent debtor to prefer
certain of his creditors and leave others without remedy, it cannot
be seen why an insolvent corporation should not be allowed a like
privilege. Although an absolute analogy in all cases might not be
drawn between the two debtors, the analogy in regard to granting
preferences certainly seems to hold good. The doctrine is based
on the idea that a person has the absolute power and control over
his property in regard to distribution and that this power is not
in any way changed or abridged by the fact that he has become insolvent and unable to pay all his debts. For the purposes of transacting business and managing its affairs the corporation is as much
a person as an individual, and owns and controls its property as
absolutely, and the fact that this artificial person is created by the
state and is controlled and managed by a board of directors instead of by its own will and volition as in the case of the individual,
in no way changes its property rights, nor denies it the right to
grant preferences to the same extent as the individual debtor.
In regard to preferences to stockholders of the insolvent corState v. Manhattan Rubber, etc., Co., 149 Mo. 181.
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poration it will be seen from the decisions that the courts consider
the actual relation to the corporation occupied by the stockholder,
and base their holdings on that rather than on the mere fact that
he is a stockholder. The whole question of preferences to members
of a corporation rests on equitable grounds of fairness and equality
and equity should not allow, between creditors whose claims are
equally meritorious, that one creditor should obtain an advantage
over another, not through any diligence or virtue in himself, but
merely because he holds an office or occupies a position in respect
to the corporation, that enables him at an earlier stage to see the
approaching calamity and secure himself against it. Thus we
see that the real question to be determined is, not whether the creditor preferred held stock in the company, but whether he was in
fact so intimately associated with its management that it would be
inequitable for him to receive special benefits derived from his
position
It may be that the stockholder is also a director or
officer or that the concern is very small and all stockholders keep in
close touch with its affairs, but, in the ordinary case that will arise,
the stockholder is no more aware of what is atually going on in
the company, than a stranger is.
There can be little doubt that by all the rules of justice and
fair dealing, a director should be barred from preferring himself
or any one with whom he is closely associated. Leaving to those
who wish to discuss it, the subject of whether a director on insolvency becomes a technical trustee, it need only be said that his
position is undoubtedly one of trust and one which demands the
highest degree of integrity. His accepting of preferences may possibly be justified from a legal point of view, but public policy demands that no such advantage should be allowed the managing
agents of a company. In some cases it may seem hard on a director
who has previously, in good faith and in a bona fide effort to help,
the company, advanced it money when possibly no one else could
be found to do so, to deny him security for his money when the
concern fails, but even that case would not justify the breaking of
the sound rule denying preferences to directors. He is not bound
to accept the position as a manager of the corporation, but having
once accepted it, he should not be allowed in any way to take advantage of his position to obtain for himself any advantage not

PREFERENCCES BY INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS

open to all creditors. Any other rule would undoubtedly place
the temptation on directors who had advanced money, to secure
to themselves a part of the assets of a failing corporation and so
hasten its end, where it would have survived the crisis had it been
in possession of all its assets and could count on the faithful and
devoted efforts of the directors to the very end.

John L. Campbell, Jr.
Lexington, Va., December, z912.
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